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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
           
 
No. 95-1555 
           
 
ROBERT ANGST, 
               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROYAL MACCABEES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;  
FEDERAL KEMPER LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY;  
DAVID J. SCHILLER, ESQUIRE, Intervenor in D.C. 
           
                     
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. No. 95-06858) 
           
                      
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 30, 1996 
 
Before:  GREENBERG and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges and  
LAY, Senior Circuit Judge* 
 
(Filed:  February 20, l996) 
                    
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
 
                             
 
* Honorable Donald P. Lay, United States Senior Circuit Judge for 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Robert Angst appeals from an order dismissing his case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1).  For the reasons below, we will affirm the decision of 
the district court. 
I. 
 Angst, a Pennsylvania citizen, sued Royal Maccabees Life 
Insurance Company and Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company.  For 
diversity purposes, Royal is a citizen of the state of Michigan 
and Kemper is a citizen of the state of Illinois.  Royal and 
Kemper each issued an insurance policy in which Angst is the 
contingent beneficiary.  Angst alleged that he is entitled to 
proceeds from both policies, but that, in violation of their 
respective insurance agreements, the defendants have refused to 
pay.  
 The policies at issue were purchased by Appellant Robert 
Angst's brother, Thomas Angst.  The Royal policy was issued on 
Thomas Angst's life, and the Kemper policy was issued on the life 
of Cynthia Papanikos-Angst, Thomas Angst's wife.  Each spouse had 
named the other as the primary beneficiary and Robert Angst as 
the alternate beneficiary.  Thomas Angst killed his wife and his 
son, then took his own life.  Robert Angst believes that he is 
entitled to the proceeds of both policies. 
II. 
 On October 14, 1994, Appellee David J. Schiller was 
appointed as the receiver for Thomas E. Angst & Associates, P.C., 
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the deceased's law practice, by the Court of Common Pleas of 
Montgomery County.  By orders dated November 7 and 14, 1994, the 
Court of Common Pleas ordered Royal to pay the proceeds of Thomas 
Angst's policy into escrow.  Robert Angst sought a dissolution of 
these orders, which the state court denied.   
 On November 15, 1994 (the day after Robert Angst filed his 
complaint in federal court), Schiller filed a complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas against Royal, Kemper and Robert Angst 
seeking to have a constructive trust imposed on the proceeds of 
the two insurance policies.  He alleged that the life insurance 
policies were purchased with funds misappropriated from the 
escrow accounts of Thomas Angst's clients.  He further alleged 
that Robert Angst would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted 
to receive the proceeds of the two policies, and that the 
proceeds belonged to certain of the law firm's creditors. 
 Schiller filed a motion to intervene in the federal action. 
The district court held a hearing on February 13, 1995, after 
which it orally granted the motion.1  As a result of the 
receiver's intervention, the court realigned the parties 
according to their interests in the litigation.  It rejected 
Robert Angst's argument that the action constituted a Rule 22 
interpleader in which the insurance companies would be the 
                     
1
  Cynthia Papanikos-Angst's father, Konstantinos Papanikos filed 
motions to intervene and to dismiss the action.  Robert Angst 
filed a motion for injunctive relief in the district court.  He 
essentially asked that Schiller be enjoined from pursuing his 
action in the state courts. 
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stakeholders and Angst and Schiller the claimants.2  Instead, the 
court determined that Angst and Schiller were "the true opposing 
parties" in the action.  Because they are both citizens of 
Pennsylvania, diversity of citizenship was destroyed and the 
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
III. 
 Angst does not dispute the propriety of Schiller's 
intervention.  Rather, he asserts that the district court should 
have realigned the parties to reflect a Rule 22 interpleader 
action.  We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
alignment of the parties with respect to diversity jurisdiction. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 942 F.2d 862, 
864 (3d Cir. 1991). 
A. Alignment of the Parties 
 Angst relies primarily upon Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952), to demonstrate 
that his situation would properly be construed as an 
interpleader.  He also cites several other cases to support the 
position that the federal courts have uniformly held that where a 
stakeholder is diverse from its claimants, diversity is satisfied 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, regardless of the citizenship of the 
claimants.   
                     
2
 Rule 22 provides that "[p]ersons having claims against the 
plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead 
when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be 
exposed to double or multiple liability. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
22(1). 
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 Nonetheless, whether a Rule 22 interpleader requires minimal 
or complete diversity is not the issue here.  It appears to be 
well-settled that diversity between the stakeholder and claimants 
is sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction if the amount in 
controversy is met.  See Kerrigan's Estate, 199 F.2d at 696; 7 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1710 
(1986).  The dispute here concerns the proper alignment of the 
parties according to their interests. 
 In City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 62 
S. Ct. 15 (1941), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the 
positioning of the parties for purposes of diversity "must be 
ascertained from the 'principal purpose of the suit,' . . . and 
the 'primary and controlling matter in dispute.'" 314 U.S. at 68 
(citations omitted).  We have reaffirmed that the correct inquiry 
turns not on some artificial position, but the "principal 
purpose" of the action: "[A] court must first identify the 
primary issue in controversy and then determine whether there is 
a real dispute by opposing parties over that issue." Wausau, 942 
F.2d at 864.  
 To identify the primary issue, we must first look to the 
pleadings submitted by the parties. Id. at 866.  We also have a 
duty to look beyond the pleadings to determine the actual 
interests of the parties.  Development Finance Corp. v. Alpha 
Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 1995).  In this 
case, Angst's complaint indicates that he seeks to compel the 
insurance companies to pay him benefits to which he believes he 
is entitled.  If Angst's complaint were the only pleading guiding 
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the "principal purpose" analysis, then an interpleader alignment 
might be proper.  As the cases cited by Angst indicate, an 
interpleader structure is often used in cases involving 
disinterested insurance companies and claimants asserting 
entitlement to insurance proceeds.  See, e.g., Aetna Life and 
Casualty Co. v. Spain, 556 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1977); John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953). 
Nonetheless, we must also take into consideration the receiver's 
motion to intervene, together with the circumstances surrounding 
the case. 
 Unlike the cases cited by Angst, in which the primary issue 
concerned which claimant was the intended beneficiary of the 
policy, in this case Schiller does not dispute that Angst is the 
correct beneficiary.  Rather, Schiller seeks to have a 
constructive trust placed on the proceeds once they are received 
by Angst.  Schiller's motion to intervene and state court 
complaint indicate that the only issue he raises is whether 
appellant should be allowed to keep the proceeds despite the fact 
that he might be the named alternate beneficiary under the 
contract.  As such, the "principal purpose" of the litigation is 
not simply to determine who is entitled to the benefits under the 
contract, but whether appellant's potential entitlement to them 
can be upheld in equity.  It is for this reason that Schiller 
intervened in the action, to which appellant did not and does not 
object.   
 Therefore, Kerrigan's Estate does not support appellant's 
argument.  In that case, this Court let stand the district 
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court's exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction in a suit 
between an executor of an estate and a relative of the deceased, 
both Pennsylvania residents, who claimed an entitlement to 
proceeds from a contract.  However, the two parties had agreed 
that they would be disinterested stakeholders in an interpleader 
action and would later resolve the ownership of the res between 
themselves. 199 F.2d at 696.  Like the insurance companies in 
John Hancock and Aetna, in Kerrigan's Estate the plaintiff was 
the stakeholder who sought a determination of the claimant's 
rights.  Under these circumstances, the district court correctly 
determined that an interpleader would not have been proper 
because Schiller and Angst are adverse to each other.   
 However, the parties' adversity does not dispose of the 
jurisdictional question.  If an intervenor's entry in the case 
can be supported by ancillary jurisdiction, diversity of 
citizenship between the intervenor and the other parties to the 
litigation is unnecessary.  See generally 7C Charles A. Wright et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1917 (1986); 3A James W. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 19.34 (2d ed. 1995).  If, 
however, the non-diverse intervenor was an indispensable party 
under Rule 19 when the complaint was filed, the action must be 
dismissed.  See Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. KN Energy, Inc., 498 
U.S. 426, 111 S. Ct. 858 (1991) (per curiam); Constain Coal 
Holdings, Inc. v. Resource Inv. Corp., 15 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 
1994).  As the district court failed to make an explicit Rule 19 
determination, we shall make an independent analysis.  See Sindia 
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Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 895 F.2d 116, 121 
(3d Cir. 1990).  
B. Rule 19 Analysis 
 Our analysis involves two steps:  first, we must determine 
whether a party is necessary under 19(a); second, we must 
determine whether it is indispensable under 19(b).  Schulman v. 
J.P. Morgan Inv. Management, Inc., 35 F.3d 799 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Rule 19(a) requires the joinder of a party who is subject to 
service of process and within the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction when: 
(1)  in the person's absence complete relief cannot be 
  accorded among those already parties, or  
 
(2)  the person claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action in the person's absence may 
 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
that person's ability to protect that 
interest or 
 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed 
interest. 
  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) & (2). 
 Accordingly, we first consider whether complete relief can 
be accorded among those who are already parties in the receiver's 
absence.  See Sindia, 895 F.2d at 121.  Completeness is 
determined on the basis of those persons who are already parties, 
and not as between a party and the absent person whose joinder is 
sought. Id. (quoting 3A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 19.07-1[1] at 
93-98 (2d ed. 1989)).  Angst and the insurance companies would 
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not receive "hollow" relief without the receiver.  As discussed 
above, the only issue between Angst, Royal and Kemper is whether 
Angst is entitled to proceeds as a named beneficiary under the 
contract.  Schiller's interest in the litigation would 
theoretically not come into play until after Angst had received 
the proceeds, as he seeks to impose a constructive trust on them. 
The possibility that the successful party to the original 
litigation might have to defend its rights in a subsequent suit 
by the receiver does not make it a necessary party to the action. 
Sindia, 895 F.2d at 122.  Therefore, Angst, Royal and Kemper 
would not necessarily be deprived of complete relief in the 
receiver's absence.  
 Notwithstanding a determination of complete relief, a party 
may still be necessary under subsection (a)(2) of the rule.  We 
first analyze the case under section (i), to determine whether 
disposition of the action without the receiver will "as a 
practical matter impair or impede" its ability to protect his 
interest in the litigation.  In order to do so, the effect of the 
federal judgment must have a "direct and immediate" effect on the 
state court proceedings.  See Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. 
Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 407 (3d Cir. 1993).  "[I]t must 
be shown that some outcome of the federal case that is reasonably 
likely can preclude the absent party with respect to an issue 
material to the absent party's rights or duties under standard 
principles governing the effect of prior judgments."  Id.   
 As the Janney Court noted, under Pennsylvania law a party 
may be precluded from relitigating an issue if the issues are 
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identical, the parties are in privity and the party against whom 
preclusion is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in a prior action.  Id. at 399 n. 12 
(citations omitted).  Because Schiller would not have a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue if he were not joined, 
state law would accord no preclusive effect to the federal court 
judgment.  As such, his absence would not, as a practical matter, 
impair his interest.  See also Schulman, 35 F.3d at 806 
(discussing Pennsylvania law and issue preclusion for purposes of 
19(b)).   
 However, the receiver's absence might subject the already 
existing parties to multiple obligations, as envisioned by 
subdivision (ii).  In this case, Angst and the insurance 
companies are already parties to a state action being prosecuted 
by the receiver.  If both actions proceed, the insurance 
companies will be asked to deposit the proceeds for the same 
insurance policies into two different escrow accounts. 
Subdivision(ii) addresses not only multiple or inconsistent 
obligations; "[t]his subdivision also helps to protect defendants 
from 'needless' multiple litigation."  Sindia, 895 F.2d at 122 
(citations omitted).  Together with the fact that a federal 
action would not have a preclusive effect on the state action, 
the existence of a prior state action in this case would subject 
the already existing parties to "needless" multiple litigation. 
Under Rule 19(a), we need only find that the party's absence 
results in any of the problems identified in the rule.  Estrella 
v. V & G Management Corp., 158 F.R.D. 575, 579 (D.N.J. 1994). 
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Accordingly, Schiller is a "party which must be joined" in the 
action pursuant to Rule 19(a).3 
 Because we determine that the receiver would have been a 
"necessary party" at the time the complaint was filed, but his 
citizenship would destroy diversity jurisdiction, we also must 
determine whether he would have been an "indispensable party." 
Under section 19(b), "the court shall determine whether in equity 
and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties 
before it . . . ."   The Rule lists four factors to be 
considered, but does not accord a particular weight to any of 
them.  "This must be determined by the court in terms of the 
facts of a given case and in light of the governing equity-and-
good-conscience test."  7 Wright et al. § 1608.  
 In this case, the fourth factor listed in Rule 19(b), 
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action 
is dismissed, is dispositive.  As discussed above, Angst will 
have an adequate remedy by way of the existing state court 
                     
3
 Angst makes much of the fact that this federal action was filed 
one day before the state action which named him as a defendant.  
However, as the district court pointed out during the hearing, 
the November 15, 1994 complaint is a related proceeding to the 
receivership proceedings.  Appellant's arguments to the contrary 
belie common sense.  The nature of a receivership is such that 
the appointed individual represents the entity in all actions 
regarding its past obligations.  David Schiller did not bring the 
November 15, 1994 state action because he personally has an 
interest in the insurance proceeds, but because the assets of the 
corporation he was appointed to manage are allegedly at stake. 
See Black's Law Dictionary 1268 (6th ed. 1990) ("[receiver is a] 
person appointed by a court for the purpose of preserving 
property of a debtor pending an action against him, or applying 
the property in satisfaction of a creditor's claim. . .").  
Schiller was appointed a receiver to the professional corporation 
by order entered October 14, 1994. 
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action, which involves all of the parties he desires to have 
included in his federal action.   
 Angst has not presented any persuasive arguments as to why 
his case should not be heard in state court.  In his brief, he 
implies that because the state court actions were assigned to the 
same state judge that handled the receivership proceedings, some 
sort of bias is operating against him.  He also alleges that the 
receivership orders came about by way of wrongful ex parte 
actions.  Again, these allegations simply do not comport with 
common sense.  A more reasonable explanation of the state court's 
judicial assignment process is that all related cases are 
assigned to the same judge.  With respect to appellant's 
allegations of ex parte conduct, appellant appears to 
misunderstand the nature of a receivership.  A receiver is a 
court-appointed individual who is to act under the supervision of 
the court.  Furthermore, no decisions made by the state court 
judge have affected appellant's substantive rights; the orders 
which he complains of require only that the insurance proceeds be 
deposited in escrow pending a substantive determination regarding 
their ownership.  In the event that the state court were to make 
some sort of legal error with respect to the case, appellant 
could simply appeal.  Under these circumstances, "equity and good 
conscience" urge us to affirm the district court's dismissal of 
the action. 
IV. 
 We hold that the district court correctly declined to 
recognize an interpleader structure among the parties involved in 
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this case.  We also hold that because Schiller, the receiver, a 
non-diverse intervenor of right, was a necessary and 
indispensable party under Rule 19 when the complaint was filed, 
the action must be dismissed.  For the foregoing reasons, we will 
affirm the district court's June 27, 1995 order.   
                              
 
 
 
        
              
